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INTRODUCTION

Consider two seemingly diverse scenarios recently addressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court: Fundamentalist Christian students sue their universities for
giving some of their mandatory activity fees to ideologically liberal student
organizations; 1 politicians and politiclll action committees across the ideological

.

• Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorgeSchool of Law. B.A., 1982,
WesleyanUniversity;J.D., 1985, University of Michigan.
I. See Southworth v. Grebe,No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXIS2196 ( Mar. 22, 2000), rev 'g
151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Anne-MarieCusac, Suingfor Jesus: A New Legal Team
Wantsto Cleansethe Campusesfor Christ,THE PROGRESSIVE,Apr. I, 1997, at 30 (describingthe
Southworthv. Grebelitigation,notingthatall three plaintiffsare fundamentalistChristiansand that
the litigationis fundedby the AllianceDefenseFund, whichin its newsletternoted th.atstudent fee
funding of"groups th.atadvocateradicalfeminism, abortion, and homose~uality"is objectionable
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spectrum challenge restrictions on the way they can collect and spend their
money. 2 The link between these two types of claims has not been obvious, but
indeed exists at a fundamental level. The question central to resolving both types
of claims is the scope of the government's discretion to redistribute speech
resources for the purpose of creating a public forum. 3 The Court identified this
question in resolving the recent student activity fee challenge,4 but not in
addressing campaign finance issue. 5 The linkage between the claims thus
remains unnoted.
One aspect of this linkage is the government purpose . In both types of cases
the government can claim that its purpose is not only consistent with, but
affirmatively serves, free speech clause values . Universities across the country
"operate against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at
the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition .',6 They thus view it
as their "business ... to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation." 7 The purpose of the student activity fees
funding mechanism is to promote diversity of expression on campus by making
it possible for a broader range of speakers to participate than could if their speech

because the groups "promote values and take actions contradictory to Christian beliefs").
2. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov 't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000) (Republican candidate for
state auditor and a political action committ~e that wanted to contribute more to him sued to enjoin enforcement of a campaign contribution limit). Similar cases have involved different plaintiffs.
See, e.g., California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1286
(E.D. Cal . 1998) (listing plaintiffs as including the California Democrati c Party, the California
Republican Party and numerous unions, as well as the named political action committee), aff' d, 164
F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999). These and other challenges to campaign contribution limits occur
against the background of the Court's decision in .Buckleyv. Valeo, 404 U.S. 1 (1976), which
interpreted the Constitution to permit some contribution limits but generally not to permit
restrictions on expenditures. l
3. See Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1040 n.S (9th Cir.
1999) (deciding in a student activ ity fees challenge whether "a public university may ...
constitutionally establish and fund a limited public forum for the expression of diverse
viewpoints."); C. Edwin Balcer, CampaignExpendituresand Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. I, 33 (1998)(arguing that the Supreme Court 's decision in Austinv. MichiganState Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 6S2 (1990), "implic itly accepts the view that campaign speech is part of a
legally structured , institutional realm in which speech can beregulated-in this case, a sphere that
can be opened to the views of people but (partially } closed to those of corporations-in order to
improve the democrat ic character of elections").
4. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at • 31 (university through fee funding
mechanism " may create what is tantamount to a li1111ited
public forum").
S. See Shrink, 120 S. Ct at 905-09 (addressing government purpose o f preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption).
6. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 , 836 (1995).
7. Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263
( 1957) (Frankfurter , ] ., concurring) (quoting THEOPENUNIVERSITIES
IN SOUTH AFRICA 10-12 (a
statement of a conference of Senior scholars from South Africa))).
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opportunities depended solely on the money they could generate in the private
economic market.8
Similarly, federal and state governments are charged with structuring and
running elections that comport with constitutional and democratic ideals.9 Full
expression from a wide range of speakers about self-government issues is at the
core of free speech clause protection.10 To the extent that campaign finance
regulations could seek to "restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others"11their purposewould beto promote
a more full exposition of viewpoints on electoral issues than occurs in a speech
market that mirrors the distribution of money in the private economy.12 This
Article argues that recognizing the government's purpose as creating and
structuring a public forum means that such an equalizing purpose could comport
with the free speech guarantee.
Another aspect of this linkage is the nature of the free speech clause claim.
In both the student activity fees and campaign finance challenges the claim was
that the Constitution limits the government's ability to redistribute speech
resources even for a purpose that may seem to serve free speech clause values.13
In the fee redistribution context, students unsuccessfully argued that such "lifesupport" for groups that "cannot survive in the marketplace of ideas" violated
their free speech rights.14 In the campaign finance context, the Court has·held
that regulationsaimed at "equalizingthe relative ability ofindividuals and groups
to influence the outcome of elections" violate the Constitution because "[t]he

8. See Rosenberger, SIS U.S. at 834 (stating that the purpose of student activity fees forum
is "to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers").
9. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1992)(rccognizing State's compelling
interestsin "[pJrotcctingthe right ofits citizens to vote freely for the candidates of their choice" and
"protect[ing) the right to vote in an election conducted with integrity and reliability").
10. See id ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretation of the First Amendment,
there is practically universal agreementthat a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs." (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))).
11. Id. at 48-49. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to forbid such an
equalizing purpose.. See id. at 49-SO. But see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,
912 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that Buckley's words "cannot be taken literally"
because "[t]he Constitution often permits restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a
few from drowning out the many.").
12. See Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A ConstiMiona/ Principle of
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 1204, 1204 (1994) (arguing for an "equal-dollars-pervoter" rule because "wealthy citi:zensshould not be permittedto have a greater ability to participate
in the electoral process simply on account of their greater wealth.").
13. See Southworthv. Grebe, No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •26 ( Mar. 2Z, 2000)
(noting "the important and substantial purposes of the University. which seeks to facilitate a wide
range of speech"), rev'g lSl F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)
(rejecting "ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the out.comeof elections" as a justification for expenditure limits).
14. Cusac, supra note l, at 30.
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First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of free
expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to
engage in public discussion." 15 Despite the different results, however, the basic
outline of the claimed individual speech right in both instances is the same: that
the free speech guarantee grants individuals speech power in the "marketplace
of ideas" in proportions that mirror their shares of economic resources in the
private financial marlcet.16 To the extent that this claimed right is indeed
contained within the Constitution, it would allow individuals to veto collective
action aimed at augmenting speech opportunities by equalizing them.
This link between the issues-the common government purpose and the same
claimed individual right to thwart it-sheds new light on both of thent. Crucial
to understanding both is a definition of the scope of the government's discretion
to choose to regulate individuals' money for the purpose of creating and
structuring a public forum. This Article provides such a definition.
Part I spells out the boundaries of the controversies that underlie the recent
cases, noting that they raise the same fundamental constitutional question of the
government's ability to redistribute speech resources to create a public forum .
Part II examines the specifics of this linkage. Part Il.A notes that in both
controversies the claimed individual speech right depends upon equating
government regulation of money with such regulation of speech. Part Il.B
identifies the common government purpose of creating and structuring a public
forum. Part II.C examines the different government means of compelling as
opposed to restricting spending. This subpart concludes that while the means
may make some difference in the constitutional "inquiry,they are not the crux of
the analysis .
Part Ill identifies and examines the factors relevant to resolving the
appropriate scope of government action in both contexts. Part IIl.A looks at the
government purposes that can justify speech market adjustment. Subparts
examine the government purposes to encourage diverse expression, to promote
fair deliberation and decision making, and to protect disfavored speakers,
concluding that each of these purposes can justify redistributing private speech
resources. Part III.B spells out effects that can invalidate speech-conscious
governmental action. Subparts discuss the dangers of government favoritism,
distorting public perceptions, and silencing speakers in the process of
encouraging greater participation in the speech market. While all of these
dangers are real and may exist intolerably in any particular case, these subparts
note that both student activity fee distribution systems and campaign finance
regulations can be structured to minimize these effects and thus enhance the
constitutionality of the government action.
Part IV applies the analysis to both issues. Part IV.A discusses student

15. Buckley,424 U.S. at 48-49.
16. See id. at 50 (rejecting expenditurelimits as inconsistentwith the free speech guarantee);
Cusac, supra note 1, at 30, 32 (quoting the president of the Alliance Defense Fund, which financed
the Southworth litigation, as stating that groups threatened by a loss of student activity fee funding
"ought to get better at the marketing business").
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activity fee funding mechanisms, explaining the multiple reasons why the fact
that fees are distributed to a wide range of student groups strongly supports the
constitutionality of the mechanism. Part IV.B discusses campaign finance
regulations. It notes that the government purpose of structuring full and fair
debate on electoral issues should be strong enough in theory to support both
contribution and spending 17 restrictions. Problems will most likely be in the
proof. The government must prove a purpose to enhance free speech clause
values, as opposed to thwart them by, for example, covertly favoring the
incumbents who usually must participate in enacting the regulations. It also must
address the difficult question of what level of restriction serves its diversity and
fair deliberation purposes while not squelching expression in the process,
although it should have some discretion to choose what this point is.

I. THECONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Mandatory Student Activity Fees

In addition to tuition, which is mandatory and funds the many aspects of
classroom learning, most universities also require students to pay "activity
fees."ta The purpose of such additional assessments is to fund activities outside
the classroom that further the universities' educational missions. 19 Although the
specifics of the amounts and methods of distribution vary, 20 such fees typically
provide funds to run student govemment,2 1 to create and circulate student

17. The Court bas upheld contribution limits as justified by other government purposes
relatingto corruption andthe appearance of corruption. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120
S. Ct. 897, 902 (2000); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. Thus the primary application of this alternate
public forum purpose is to justify expenditure limits which require more compelling justification
than contribution limits. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 904. Neverthel.ess,the public forum purpose
should serve as an additional justification for contribution restrictions as well. See id. at 911
(Breyer & Ginsberg, IJ., concurring) (.. (B]y limiting the size of the largest contributors, such
restrictionsaim to democratizethe influence that money itself may bring to bear upon the electoral
process.").
18. See DAVID L. MEABON ETAL., SnJDENTACTIVITYFEES: A LEGAL ANDNATIONAL
PERsPECTIVE24 (1979) (9()0/oof universities fund student activities with mandatory fees).
19. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995)
("(T)hepurpose of the (Universityof Virginia Student Activities Fund) is to support a broad range
of extracurricularstudent activities that 'are related to the educationalpurpose of the University.'"
(quoting App. to Pet for Cert. 6la)) .
20. See Southworth v..Grebe, No. 98-ll89, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at• 10-11 (Mar. 22,
2000) (student activity fee for the 1995-1996 academic year was $331.50; Regents control
distribution of one portion, student body controls di~bution of the portion to student groups,
subjectto Regents' approval), rev'g I 51 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998); Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 824
(studentactivity fee is $14 per semester; student council has initial authority to disburse funds, but
its actions are reviewable by a faculty body).
21. See, e.g., Southworth, 151 F.3d at 717 ("[F]ees fund ... the Associated Students of
Madison budget"); Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1993) (noting that

..
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publications, 22 and to pay for some or all of the activities conducted by a range
of student organizations. 23
The organizations funded are typically composed of students unh~d by a
common interest or pursuit.2'1 These unifying features may include academics,2S
recreation, 26 religious belief, 27 recognition and celebration of culture,2-8
ethnicity, 29 or sexual orientation, 30 or discussion and advocacy with respect to
particular social issues. 31 Some of these student groups are affiliated with state,
national, or international organizations. 32
The recent case before the Court centered around a university's authority to
allocate a portion of mandatory student activity fees to student groups that

proceeds of University of California student fees "support a wide variety of activities in addition
to student government").
22. See, e.g ., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822 (describingthe university's authorizationof"the
payment of outside contractors for the printing costs of a variety of student publications"); Kania
v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 47S, 476 (4th Cir. 1983) (student fees fund The Daily Tar Heel at the
University of North Carolina).
23. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at• 11(during the 1995-1996school year fees
funded 623 groups); Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1999)
(fees fund "[o]ver eighty University organiz.ations,including athletic, culturally-oriented, and
political group's").
24. See DaveNewhart, College StudenJ Fees Face First AmendmenJ Test, CH.I.TRIB., June
4, 1997, § 1, at 17 ("[F]ees . .. go to special-interestgroups such as chess clubs, black student
unions, Asian-Americanassociationsand food science clubs.").
25. See Smith, 844 P.2d at 504 ("Mostof the registeredstudent groups [fundedwith activity
fees] arc devoted to academic, cultural, or recreationalpursuits. The Physics StudentsSociety [is
.
a] random, typical examplcQ....).
26. See Southworth, 1St F.3d at 719 (nonallocableportion of student fees cover"the first
and second year of the Recreational Sports budget''); Smith, 844 P.2d at 504.
27. See Rosenberger, 51 SU.S. at 847 (interpretingConstitution to requireuniversityto fund
Wide Awake : A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia when the university funded a
wide range ofother student publications);Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1039(organizationsfunded include
the Muslim Student Association and the Jewish Student Union).
28. See Smith, 844 P.2d at 504 (''typical student group;' is the SpanishClub); Rounds, 166
F.3d at 1034 ("culturally-oriented"student groups receive fee funding).
29. See Newhart, supra note 24, at 17 (groups funded include "black student unions [and]
Asian-Americanassociations").
30. See Southworth, l 51 F.3d at 720 (the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual CampusCenter receives
fees funding); Smith, 844 P.2d at 504 (Gay and Lesbian League rec.civesfees funding).
31. These causes vary widely and can include such causes as environmentalpreservation,
see Smith, 844 P.2d at 504 (student affiliates of the SierraClub), AIDS awarcness,seeSouthworth,
1SI F.3d at 702 (fees fund the MadisonAIDS SupportNetwork), and to promote"sensitivity to and
tolerance of Christian viewpoints,"Rosenberger , 51S U.S. at 826-27(notingthat this is the purpose
of Wide Awake Productions, a student group entitled to funding by student fees).
32. For example,student organimtionssuch as AmnestYInternational, Greenpeace, and the
National Organiz.ationfor Women have national affiliates.
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engaged in "political or ideological" expression that conflicted with the personal
beliefs of the student plaintiffs forced, through the fee mechanism, to fund it.33
On the one hand , the Court had held that in some instances universities must fund
student groups ' ideological speech. 34 Specifically, where a university funds a
wide range 'of student publications, the free speech clause of the First
Amendment prohibits the school from discriminating against those that express
a religious ideology. 3' On the other hand , in the context of compul sory union
security fees36 and attorney bar dues, 37 the Court had interpreted the Constitution
to place limits on the gov~rnment's use of dissenters ' fees to fund special
activities. Specifically, in both of those instances , the Court had held that the
Constitution limits the use of mandatory monetary exact ions from individuals to
expressive activities "gennane " to the government's purpose for creating the
organization and compelling the payments to it.38 These decisions , in turn, were
extensions of the Court's holding that the First Amendment " freedom of speech"
guarantee includes the right not to speak. 39 As the right to "co ntribut[ e] to an

33. Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196 , at •19 (cit ing Southworth, 151 F.3d at 73 1, 735).
34. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834 (''University may not discriminate based on the
viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates" when it "expends funds to encourage a
d iversity of views from private speakers.").
3S. See id at 819 (invali dating a prohibition on funding a publication that '" primar ily
promotes or manifests a particular belie[fJ in or about a deity or an ultimate reality '" as
discriminatory when university funds wide range of other publications (quoting App. to Pet. for
Cert. 61a }).
Prior to the recent decision , e-0urts had differed on the extent to which the Constitution
prohibited mandatory student fees to be used to fund educational activities that include political or
ideological speec h. CompareRounds v. Oregon State Bd . of Educ., 166 F.3d 1032 , 1038 (9th Cir .
1999) (use of student activity fees at University of Oregon to fund Oregon Student Public Interest
Group Education Fund (OSPIRG EF) is constitutional where funding creates a "diverse ... limited
public forum" and separate education fund "limits university funding to educational activities,"
which may include political speech , rather than the " legislative lobbying and more overtly political
action " engaged in by the paren t, nonstudent OSPIRG}, with Southworth, ISi P.3d at 732 ("The
First Amendment is offended by the Regents' use of objecting students' fees to subsidize
organiu.tions which engage in political and ideological activities" regardless of whether the funding
is gennane to the universities' mission in that it creates a public forum for diverse expression. ").
36. See Abood v . Detroit Bd. of Educ. , 431 U.S . 209 {1977).
37. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal ., 496 U .S. 1 (1990).
38. Id. at 13.
Aboodheld that a union could not expend a dissenting individual 's dues for ideological
activities not 'germane' to the purpose for which compelled association was justified:
collective bargaining .. .. The State B:ar may therefore constitutionally fund activities
gennane to [its] goals out of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however ,
in such manner fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas
·
o f activity.

Id at 13·14 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 23S) .
39. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 634 ( 1943) (rejecting the
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organization for the purpose of spreadinga politicalmessage is protectedby the
First Amendment,'>40so, too, is the right to refrain from making such
contributions.41
Because of the similarity of compelledcontribtJtions,courts had appliedthe
analysis drawn from the union and bar due cases to answer the student activity
fees controversy,41 reachingconflictingresuIts.43 The conflicts illustratedthat the
gennaneness test is not self-defining.44 Rather, it requires a judgment about the
closeness of the relationship between an organization's activities and its
legitimate mission.45 Moreover, because there are degrees of "gennaneness,"46
this judgment must include an assessmentof the free speech clause interests on
both sides of the controversy.47 The problem with lifting the analysis from the
previous mandatorypaymentcases and applyingit to the studentfees issue is that
the surface similarity between the cases obscures constitutionally significant
differences between the types of cases.

proposition that "a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left
it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind."); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking arc
complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind."' (quoting
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)).
40. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976)).
4 I. See id. ("The fact that the appelIants arc compelledto make, rather than prohibited from
making, contributions for political purposes worlcsno less an infringementof their constitutional
rights.").
42. See, e.g., Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. ofEduc., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036-37(9th Cir. 1999)
("We do not confront these issues in a vacuum, for the Supreme Court has already constructedthe
analytical framework for our examination," citing the gennaneness test from Abood and Keller);
Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting the need to apply a "germaneness
analysis"), rev 'd, No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196 (March 22, 2000).
43. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •20 (noting "conflicting results" in lower
courts); Rosenberger
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., SIS U.S. 819, 851 (1995)
(O'Connor, I. , concurring) (noting "a split in the lower courts'' with respect to the application of
the Abood/Keller analysis to student activity fees).
44. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at *27 (noting that "it is difficult to define
germane speech with ease or precision where a union or bar association is the party, [and] the
standard becomes all the more unmanageablein the public university setting."); see also Rounds,
166 F.3d at 1037 ("These principles are easily described in theory: application is a more operose
task."); Southworth, 151 F.3d at 723-24 ("Abood did not provide much guidance as to its actual
application . .. . Keller still left many lines to bedrawn.").
45. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15 (1990) (noting that the gennaneness of
activities to an organization's purpose will fall on a "spectrum").
46. See Southworth, 1S1 F.3d at 727 (rejecting a "broad reading of gennaneness")(citation
omitted).
47. See Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1039 (noting that in the context of student activity fees the
goals of the university in compelling payments "arc inextricably connected with the underlying
policies of the First Amendment").
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The difference relied upon by the Court in rejecting application of the
germaneness standard to the student fee context is the "vast unexplored bounds"
of the speech public universities seek to encourage. 48 A more precise way of
stating this difference between the cases that is crucial to the constitutional
analysis is that in previous cases, the government created an organization to serve
a primarily nonspeech function. 49 In several ways this primarily nonspeech
governmental purpose supported !l constitutional interpretation limiting the use
of mandatory payments for speech. First, the government did not have positive
free speech interests inherent in the collective purpose to hold up against the free
speech interests of dissenters.so Second, excising some tangential speech
activities to serve the interests of individual dissenters did not significantly
undermine the collective purpose.st Third, because the government purpose was
to fund a single organization dedicated to pursuing a nonspeech objective, the
speech incidentally funded would be of one viewpoint chosen by those who had
majority control of the government-created organization.s 2 The effect of
compulsory funding of such speech would therefore be to redirect private speech
resources from minority to majority viewpoints, skewing the marketplace of
ideas in a way most inimical to free speech clause values.53 This combination of

48. Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at *27.
49. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 13 ("[T)he compelled association and integrated bar are justified
by the State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal
services.") ; Abood v. Detroit Bel. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226-27 (1977) (legitimate purpose of
union is to engage in "collective bargaining. contract administration, and grievance adjustment").
SO. Compare Keller, 496 U.S. at 14 ("[T)he guiding standard must be whether the
challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the
legal profession or 'improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of the
State."'), with Rounds, 166 F.3d at I038 ("In assessing purpose , it is of the utmost significance that
the organizational speech at issue occurs in an academic setting, for '[i]t is the business of a
university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation."' (quoting Sweezy v. State, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(quoting CONFERENCE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNIV. OF CAPETOWN & THE UNIV. OF
WITSWATERRANO,THE OPEN UNIVERSITlES
INSOUTI!AFRICA I 0-12 ( l 957)) )).
SI. See Keller, 496 U.S . at 16 (while "[c]ompulsory dues may not be expended to endorse
or advance a gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative[,] ... petitioners have no valid
constitutional objection to their compulsory dues being spent for activities connected with
disciplining members of the Bar or proposing ethical codes for the profession."); Abood,431 U.S.
at236 (noting that the constitutional inquiry involves "drawing lines between collective-bargaining
activities, for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to
collective bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited").
52. See Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 480 (4th Cir. 1983) (''In Abood the plaintiffs
alleged that they had no control over the Union's communications, and that these communications
were one-sided presentations of the ' Union ' s viewpoint "' (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 275
(Powell, J., concurring))) .
53. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("The First Amendment
generally prevents government from proscribing speech [because] of disapproval of the ideas
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f~ctors-{ I) a primary nonspeech collective · purpose, (2) speech activities
tangentially related to it (and therefore dispensable), and (3) a majority
viewpoint-discriminatory speech market impact-explain the existence of the
individual right to thwart collective speech activities in the context of
organizations that serve nonspeech governmental objectives. 54
Both the governmental purpose and the marketplace of ideas impact of the
speech funded differ in the context of student activity fees. Universities frankly
acknowledge that their purpose in compelling fees to support organizations that
may engage in political or ideological activities is to create a public forum for
speech and debate to supplement that w~ich would exist were student speech to
depend solely on private funding .ss Thus, where creating a public forum is the
purpose, 56 funding speech in the university context is not incidental to some other
nonspeech objective. Funding speech is the objective. While this purpose would
render the government action highly suspect if carried out in a way that exhibited
official favoritism of particular points ofview,57 the universities argued that the
neutral funding of a wide range of viewpoints within the created forum s
enhances, rather thanendangers, free speech clause values. 58 Because of the free
speech clause value inherent in the government purpose of creating a forum,59
limiting the permissible speech funding would both significantly undermine the

expressed.").
54. But see Nonnan L. Cantor,ForcedPaymentsto ServiceInstitutionsand Constitutional
Interestsin IdeologicalNon-Association,36 RUTGERS
L. REv. 3, 6-7 (1983) (arguing "Abood and
cases akin to it are essentially askew.... The constitutional issues genuinely at stake d,o not
preclude the collection of service fees from idoologicallyoffendedpayors.").
55. See Rounds, 166 F.3d at I 039 (by funding a "broad range of extracurricularactivities
that are related to the educationalpurposeof the University,"the Universityhas "createda limited
public forum ... that encourages' a diversityof views from privatespeakers"' (citing Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., SI 5 U.S. 819, 824, 830, 834 (1995)));Kania, 702 F.2d
at 477 (the student newspaperfundedby studentactivityfees serves"the state's legitimateinterest
in creatingthe richest possibleeducationalenvironmel\tat the Universityand, in its role as a forum
for the expressionof differingviewpoints,is a vital instrumentof the University's 'marketplace of
ideas."').
56. This Article deals with instanceswherecreatingand publicspeechforum is at least one
of the university's purposes. Wherethis is not one of the purposes,as wherea universityfunds the
organiz.ationto provide educationalbenefitsto its students,this analysismay not apply. See, e.g.,
Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (1985).
57. See Rosenberger,SIS U.S. at 830-31 (when the government creates a limited public
forum, it may engage in content discriminationto the extent necessaryto preservethe purposes of
the forum, but it may not engage in viewpointdiscrimination).
58. See, e.g., Kania,702F.2d at 480 (thestudentnewspaper"increasesthe ovenll exchange
of infonnation, ideas, and opinions on the campus").
59. See Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, IOOt(2d Cir. 1992)("A university's interest in
maintaininga thriving campus forum ... is itselfa concernof constitutionaldimensions,since the
central purp,oseof the First Amendmentis to guaranteethe free interchangeof views and energetic
debate.j.
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government purpose 60 and disserve free speech clause values. 61 Additionally ,
unlike previous cases, the effect of the compulsory funding is not to skew the
marketplace of ideas toward a majority-chosen point of view. 62 All of these
reasons explain the Court's decision to distinguish an individual student's
constitutional claim to opt out of financially supporting .certain expressive
activities within the forum from the claims of public employees or state attorneys
that political speech and lobbying by their respective organizations violate the
free speech guarantee.
But these are not the only difference .s between the previous compelled
funding cases and the recent challenges to the use of student activity fees.
Another crucial difference not noted by the Court in its recent decision
complicates the constitutional ~alysis.
In particular, characterizing the
university funding schemes as "neutral," 63 while true in the sense that funding
does not depend upon the viewpoi~t of the organizations' intended expression, 64
hides a crucial aspect of both the purpose and effect of creating the fee forum .
Universities claim the right of a collective majority to choose as a common
purpose promoting, through the ex~nditure of collective resources, diverse ,
including nonmajority, expression.'
To fulfill this purpose the universities
collect resources from students with majority points of view and redirect them
to students with minority viewpoints. So, while the government action does not
privilege a majority-favored viewpoint, it nevertheless has a speech market
impact.66 Specifically, by taking majority resources to fund minority speech the

60. See, e.g.,Cusac, supra note l, at 31 (without studentactivity fee funding "much student
expressionwill end"); Newbart,supra note 24, at 17(noting that the hardest hit student groups will
bethe smallest and most controversial).
61. See, e.g., Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting that the university's goals and "underlying policies of the First Amendment" are
"inextricablyconnected"); Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. l998XWood. J.,
· dissentingfrom denial ofrehearing en bane) ("[G)raftingdissenters' rights onto a neutral forum for
theexpressionof a full panoply of viewpointswill most likely eliminatethe forum altogether, which
is a perverseway indeedto safeguardthe kind of free and open political and intellectualdebate that
liesat the heart oftheFirstAmendment."), rev'd, No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196 ( Mar. 22,
2000)
62. See Kania, 702 F.2d at 480. While "[t]he mandatory fees in Abood . .. enhanced the
powerof pne, and only one, ideologicalgroup to further its politicalgoalsL the student newspaper]
increasesthe overall exchange of information, ideas, and opinions on the campus." Id
63. Rosenberger v. Rector & Regents of the Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995)
(University may "ration or allocate [the] scarce resourceson some acceptable neutral principle").
64. See id. at 834 ("University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private
p~ns whose speech it facilitates .'').
65. See id at 834 (University's purpose is to "expend0 funds to encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers").
66. See Southworth,I 5I F.3d at729 ("[T)he Regents attempt tojustify forcing the objecting
students to fund these organizations because without funding less spccch·wm result, and less
controversialspeech.").
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government purposefully adjusts the mix of voices in the marketplace of ideas,
augmenting the volume of minority speakers to enhance the diversity available
for public consumption.
This explicit government purpose to manipulate the marketplace of ideas
means that the student activity fees cases posed a fundamentally different
constitutional question than the earlier compel led payment cases involving union
or bar dues. 67 In the case of activity fees, dissenting students claimed a
constitutional right to thwart a common purpose that the majority government
claims serves free speech clause values. 68 Most basically, their claim was that
the free speech clause forbids the government to reallocate speech resources
among private parties. 69 Consequently, at issue in the student activity fees
controversy was a collective majority's power to compel its members to support
the common purpose of adjusting the relative weights of the voices in the
marketplace of ideas to promote more full dialogue and debate. 70

B. Campaign Finance Regulations
Campaign finance regulations are efforts by government to control the
influence of money on politics. While there is no doubt that contributions and
expenditures by persons and entities to and on behalf of candidates for office is
an important and valuable part of the political process, 11 campaign finance
regulations represent governmental determinations that large monetary transfers
of either type undermine the integrity ·of the political process. 72 The current

67. See Leslie Gi.elow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and Mandatory Payments: Creating
Coherency in CompelledExpression,S2 RuroERSL. RBv. 123(1999) (arguingthat the Supreme
Court's compelledexpressioncasesare bestexplainedas applyingstrictjudicial scrutinywherethe
government's purpose is to manipulatethe mar.ketplaceof ideas).
68. Southworth, 1SI F.3d at 730 ("(The Regents]point to the educationalbenefits flowing
from the very speech to which the plaintiffsso strenuouslyobject.").
69. See id. at 731 (holding that these students cannot.be requiredto "fund what they don't
,
believe").
70. See id. at 729 n.10 ("The Regents ... argue that .. . all students benefit from 'robust
debate"') (citation omitted).
71. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l (1976). "Discussionof public issues and debate on
the qualificationsof candidatesare integralto the operationof the systemof governmentestablished
by our Constitution." Id. at 14. "(C]ontributionand expenditurelimitationsimposedirect quantity
restrictions on political communicationand association." Id at 18.
72. See Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in
Search ofReform, 9 YALEL. & POL•y RBv.279, 280 (199l) (noting that Congresshas historically
passed campaignfinance refonns in responseto scandals, includingthe Tillman Act, Pub. L. No.
59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907)( codifiedas amendedat 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988)), passedto prevent large
corporate contributions like those to presidential candidates William McKinley and Theodore
Roosevelt; the Federal Corrupt PracticesAct of I 925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. I 070 (codified in scattered
sections of 2 and 18 U.S.C.), passed in response to the Teapot Dome Scandal; and the 1974
Amendments to the Federal Election CampaignAct (FECA), Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1272
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constitutional controversy centers around the scope of the government's authority
to regulate campaign financing according to its determination of the public
interest.73
The blueprint for the scope of the government's authority to regulate
campaign financing comes from the Court's review of Congress's effort to
regulate federal campaigns after the Watergate scandals. 74 The Federal Election
Campaign Act (''FECA"), 75 as amended, limited individual contributions to
candidates,76 limited expenditures both by candidatesn and by individuals that
related to a particular candidate, 78 and imposed reporting requirements. 79 In
Buckley v. Valeo,8°the Court generally upheld the contribution limits 81 and
reporting12 requirements but invalidated the expenditure limits as in conflict with
the free speech and associ~tion guarantees. 13 The Court found that contribution
limits impose "only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage
in free communication" 84 and that ' FECA's primary purpose-"to limit the
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial

(codified asamended at 2 U.S.C. § 431-455 (1988)) adopted after the abuses of the 1972
presidentialelection). Congressional efforts to respond to scandals continue. ·see Jeremy Paul,
Campaign Reform/or the 21st Century: Putting Mouth Where the Money ls, 30 CONN. L . REV.
779,780 n.2 (1998) (surveying congressionalreform proposals in light of alleged 1996 campaign
fmanceabuses).
73. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanyingtext.
74. SeeROBERTE.MUTCH,CAMPAIONS,CONORESSANDCOURTS
:THE MAKINoOFFEDERAL
CAMPAIGNFINANCE LAW 47-49 (1988) (describing that public demands for campaign finance
reformcompelled legislatorsto act}.
75. Congress first passedthe PECA in 1971. Federal El_ectionCampaignAct of 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971). The amendmentswere the subject of Supreme Court review.
FederalElection Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)
(codifiedas amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1998)).
· 76. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(b}(I), (3) (1994} (individuals may not contribute more than
$25,000in a single year or more than $1000 to any single candidate for an election campaign}.
77. See id. § 608(a), (c} (limiting candidates' use of personal and family resources in their
campaignand capping the overall amount candidates can spend campaigning for federal office).
78. See id. § 608(e) (individuals may not spend more than $1000 per year·"relative to a
clearlyidentified candidate"}.
79. See 2 U.S.C. § 431-456 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
80. 424 U.S. I (1976}.
81. See id. at 59. 1'The contribution ceilings Oserve the basic governmental interest in
safeguardingthe integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of
individualcitizens and candidatesto engage in political debate and discussion." Id.
82. See id at 85 ("(W]e findno constitutionalinfirmitiesin the recordkeeping, reporting and
disclosureprovisions of the Act."}.
83. See id at 59 ("[The expenditure limits] place substantial and direct restrictions on the
ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression,
restrictionsthat the First Amendmentcannot tolerate.").
84. Id. at 20.
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contributions"-was sufficientto justify the Act's $1000 per person contribution
limit. 15 By contrast, the Act's expenditure limits "impose direct and substantial
restraints on the quantity of political speech." 16 The Court found the
governmental interest in preventing corruption or its appearance inadequate to
justify the expenditure Jimits.87 The Court held that the governmental interests
in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption are inadequate to
justify the ceiling on independent expenditures because (I) donors can easily
evade the Act's limit on expenditures clearly identified with a candidate; and (2)
independent advocacy does not pose the same danger of corruption as
contributions. 88 However, the Court also stated that the governmental interest in
preventing corruption "does not support the limitation on the candidate's
expenditure of his own personal funds." 19 Additionally, the preventing
corruption interest is not sufficient to justify overall campaign expenditure caps.
The Court also found the alternative government interest "in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections"
by "restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others" to be"wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 90
Despite the Buckley Court's articulation of the constitutional values attached
to campaign-related spending and giving, public perception of the damage to the
democratic process caused by money in politics has grown since that decision. 91
Public pressure has resulted in governmental efforts, by Congress, 92 state
legislatures, 93 and voter initiatives,94 to craft refonns that will survive Buckley 's
guidelines. Inevitably, these reform efforts end up bogged down for years in
litigation. 95
.

.. ...~·~ . .: .

..-~.. .

85. Id. at 26.
86. Id. at 39.
87. See id. at 45.
88. See id. at 54.
89. Id. at 56.
90. Id. at 46-47 (independentexpenditures);see id. at 52, 57-58 (rejectingthis interest in
the contexts of candidateexpendituresand overallcampaign spendingcaps).
91. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 72, at 779 (citing news articlesand surveysreflectingpublic
attitudes after the 1996federalelections. "[V]inually everyoneagreesthere arc problemswith the
way Americanelections are conducted.").
92. See, e.g., Molly Peterson, Reexamining CompellingState Interests and Radical State
Campaign Finance Reforms: So Goes the Nation?, 25 HASTINGSCONST. L. Q. 421, 426 (1998)
("In the first sessionof the 105th Congress,at least one hundred pending House and Senate bills
proposed changes to existing federalcampaign financeJaws. .. ,").
93. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Connolly,How Low Can You Go? State CampaignContribution
Limits and the First Amendment,16 B.U.L. REY.483, 497-98 (1996)(noting that "[b]y the end of
1993, all but eighteen states had imposed some fonn of contribution caps applicable to state
election campaigns" and that "[m]ostof these limits came about through state legislation.").
94. See id. at 498 (listing examplesof state contributionlimits that were products of voter
initiatives).
95. See Kristen Byrnes,A Survey of FederalCases WhichInvolve CampaignFinancing, 7
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Because of Buckley's seeminglyblanket condemnationof expenditure
limits, 96 these reforms have primarily embodied contribution Iimits.97 The focus
of courts evaluating them has been Buckley 's requirement that the government
demonstrate a "sufficiently important interest" to justify the limit and that the
limit be "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational
freedoms ." 98 Evaluation of the government interest has focused on preventing
corruption or its appearance, 99 which in tum requires defining corruption 100 and
evaluating evidence of its existence 101 and public perceptions about it. 102 In the
tailoring inquiry, courts have looked to the amount of the limit, 103 often relying
on Buckley 's other requirement that limits not be so low as to prevent candidates

B.U. PuB. INT.L.J. 333 (1998) (noting litigation status of state campaign finance regulations).
96. See Harold Leventhal, Courtsand Po/iJicalThickets,11 COLUM.
L. REY.345,358,373
(1977) (noting absolute language of Buckley's expenditure limit condemnation).
97. A wide range of other types of reforms have been proposed. See CENTERFOR
REsPONSIVEPoLmCS,MONEYINPoLrncsREFoRM:
PRINCIPLES,PROBLEMSANDPROPOSALS 1, 1117 (1996) (listing possibilities). Some states have experimented with "voluntary' 1 expenditure
limits coupled with increasedcontribution limits for those candidateswho agree to theexpenditure
limits. See, e.g., California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282,
1287(E.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that California's Proposition 208 contains such a provision},ajf'd,
164F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999).
98. Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (E.D. Arlc.1997)(quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)). See, e.g., ArkansasRight to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler,
983 F. Supp. .1209, 1220 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (noting need to determine whether the contribution
linut at issue "burdens the exercise of political speech and, if it does, whether it is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest" (quoting Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422,
1424 (8th Cir. 1995), rev 'd. 120 S. Ct. 987 (2000))); California Prolife, 989 F. Supp. al 1293
(citingBuckley,424 U.S. at 2S).
99. See California Prolife, 989 F. Supp. at 1293 (finding that deterring corruption in
governmentwas a legitimate governmentinterest, but that low contribution limits t~at would apply
to candidateswho did not accept voluntary expenditure limits were not closely drawn to serve the
interest).
I00. See, e.g., Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in CampaignFinafla! Law, 14
CONST.
CoMM. 127 (1997) (noting difficulties in defining corruption); Ronald A Cass, Money,
Power,and Politics:·GovernanceModels and CampaignFinance Regulation, 6 SUP.CT. EcoN.
REY. I, 31 (1998) ("Referencesto corruption elicit strong visceral reactions, but corruption is not
soeasilydefinedas those reactionsmight suggest."); Frank J. Sorauf, Caughtin a PoliticalThicket:
The Supreme Court and Campaign Finance, 3 CONST.COMM.97, 103 (1986) (corruption's
"apparentclarity is deceptive, and its origin is at best clouded"}.
IO1.. See, e.g., CaliforniaProlife,989 F. Supp. at 1294(noting thatthe governmentmust have
a substantialreasonto suspectcorruptiontojustify campaign financeregulation and that conviction
of some members of California legislature for bribery supported the government's interest).
102. See id. at 1286-87 (noting that fact that Californiansvoted for Proposition 208, which
was the subject of the litigation, indicated that they suspected corruption).
103. This is not, however, "a constitutional minimum below which legislatures cannot
regulate." Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 909 (2000).
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from mounting a successful campaign. 10"
The upshot of Buclcley has been to severely cripple governments' efforts to
rem~dy what they perceive to be the damaging influence of money on the
political ·process. That governments cannot enact expenditure limits creates
gaping loopholes that critically undermine the effectiveness of contribution limits
and other types of campaign finance regulations. •osMoreover, even these other
types of restrictions remain vulnerable to reviewing courts' determinations,
pursuant to Buckley, that the First Amendment protects individuals from such
government regulation . 106
The constitutional dilemma in the context of campaign financing is thus the
correctness of Buckley 's balance between the individual's free speech right and
the collective majority's power to regulate the speech market according to its
vision of the public good and free speech clause values. 107 The current focus of
campaign finance reforms and litigation stems from the Court's early rejection
of a valid government interest in equalizing the volume of the voices that
participate in political campaigns. u>1i Although the means of restriction did not
exhibit government favoritism of particular points of view, crucial to the Court
was that the government's purpose was nevertheless speech market-related. 109
Specifically, the government's purpose was to adjust the mix of voices in the
speech market, restricting the volume of majority speakers to enhance the
diversity of ideas available for public consumption. 110 By finding such a purpose
..

· ~ ... ·.

:.<,•, .:'·· : , :

~· ;: .. ..

'

.

.,,,

. ··.. "
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104. See id. (rather than a specific dollar amount, the test is whether "the constitution
limitation [is] so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of
a candidate's voice below notice, and render contributions pointless").
105. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S . 480,511 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (" As in Buckley, I am convinced that it Is pointless to
limit the amount that can be contributed to a candidate or spent with his approval without also
limiting the amounts ·that can be spent on his behalf.") (footnote omitted). "[Independent
expenditure] controls are imperative if Congress is to enact meaningful limits on direct
contributions ." Id. at n.9 (citing S. REP. No. 93-689, at 18-_19(1974) reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5604-5605)
106. See, e.g., CaliforniaProlife, 989 F. Supp. at 1293 (inv11lidatingcontribution limits as
not sufficiently related to interest in deterring corruption).
I 07. See EdwardB. Foley, Philosophy, the Constitution, and Campaign Finance , 10 STAN.
L. & POL' YREV. 23, 23 (1998) (arguing that "the United States Constitution should be construed
to permit Congress to choose [among visions of campaign finance reform].").
108. See Bucldey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
109. See id. at 18.
Although the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to
its regulations, ... it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged
"conduct" of giving or spending money "arises in some measure because the
communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful."
Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien , 391 U.S. 376,382 (1968)).
110. In the campaign finance context, the speech market adjustment purpose is closely related
to a purpose to adjust "the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes." Id. at 17.
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.antithetical to the First Amendment, the Court articulated a constitutional vision
in which an individual's interest in unlimited campaign spending trumps the
collective majority's interest in restricting itto serve a public interest in ensuring
full and robust political dialogue and debate. 111

II. THECONSTITUTIONALLINK
The link between the student activity fee and campaign finance issues is that
both require defining the scope of the individual free speech right against the
scope of the government's discret iion to create and structure a forum for
expression by a broad range of speakers. Determining the meaning of the free
speech clause in any particular <;ontext requires assessing the nature and weight
of the individual's free speech interests , the interests served by the government
action and the free speech impact of the government's means of achieving its
objective. 112 All of these elements are substantially the same in the contexts of
mandatory student activity fees that fund expression and campaign finance
regulations.

A. The Individual Free Speech Right: Money = Speech
The crucial premise that defines the individual free speech right in both the
student activity fees and campaign finance contexts is that money is speech. 113
So, compelling an individual to fund speech is the same as compelling the

11l. See id. at 48. "Advocacyof the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no
less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy
generallyor advocacyof the passageor defeat of legislation." Id. Additionally,the Court held that
"theFirstAmendmentsimplycannottolerate [theAct's) restrictionupon the freedomofa candidate
to speakwithout legislative limit on behalf of his own candidacy." Id. at 54.
112. All of the various tests used to determine free speech issues require consideration of
thesefactors. See,e.g., Turner BroadcastingSystem,Inc. v. Federal CommunicationsComm., 512
U.S.622, 662 ( 1994)("The intermediatelevel of scrutiny [requiresthat a) regulationpromoteOa
substantialgovernment interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."
(quotingWard v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989))); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Membersof the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 ( 1991) (under strict scrutiny,
Courtlooksto where the governmentaction «is necessaryto serve a compellingstate interest and
is narrowlydrawn to achieve that end"); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985);
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (regulation of ex.pressiveconduct will be upheld if "it 'furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppressionof free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedomsis no greater than is essentialto the furtheranceof that interest.").
113. See Rosenbergerv. Rector & Regents of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,830 (1995)
(studentact.ivity fund is a speech forum "more in a metaphysicalthan in a spatial or geographic
sense, but the same principles are applicable"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (''A restriction on the
amountof money a person or group can spend on political communicationduring a campaign
necessarilyreduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depthof their exploration,and the size of the audiencereached,'.').
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individual to speak 114 and restricting an individual's expenditures toward
speech 115 is the same as restricting the individual's speech directly .116
Of course, money is not really speech. 117 And, compelling or restricting the
payment of money that is used for speech 118 is not exactly the same as compelling
or restricting speech directly .119 Rather , the money = speech equation made by
the Court in both contexts constitutes a judgment that the government actions
regarding money are enough like government actions aimed at speech that they
should be subject to the same constitutional scrutiny. 120
A number of variables can make types of cases "the same" for purposes of
free speech claus~ analysis. . Language in the decisions implying that the
individual autonomy impact of compelled 121 or restricted 122 expenditures make~

.:,"'.
,.:

.·:_

:'

•• <

~

,~.

114.' See
Abood° v. Detrot Bd . ofEduc., 431 U.~ . 209, 235-36 (l 977)(equating compelled
funding of speech with compelled recitation of the pledge of allegiance (citing West Virginia Bd.
ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 ( 1943))).
l 15. In the context of campaign finance regulations, the Court has distinguished expenditure
re strictio ns from contribution restrictions . The former constitute '$direct restraints on speech," while
the latter "[bear ] more heavily on the association or right than on freedom ~o speak." Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct 897, 899 (2000) (citing Buc/c/ey,424 U.S. at 19, 24-25).
116. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 (" [C)ontributing to an organization for the purpose of
spreading a political message ... ' impHcate[s] fundamental First Amendment interests."' (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23)); Buc/c/ey, 424 U.S. at 16 ("The expenditure of money simply cannot be
equated with Oconduct.' ').
117. See FederalElectionCommissionv. NationalConservativePoliticalAction Committee,
470 U.S. 480 , 493 (1985) where the Court held that "the expenditures at issue in this case produce
speech at the core of the First Amendment." Additionally , as one dissenter noted, " (Expenditures]
produce such speech: they arc not speech itself." id. at 509 (White, J., dissenting) . See also
Shrink, 120 S. Ct at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Money is property ; it is not speech. ") .
118. Not every dollar of every contribution or expenditure is used for speech . See Buckley,
424 U.S. at 263 (White, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("There are Omany expensive
campaign activities that arc not themselves communicative or remotely related to speech .") .
1l 9. See FederalElection Comm'n, 470 U.S . at 508-09 (White, l , dissenting) ("The burden
on actual speech imposed by limitations on the spending of money is minimal and indirect All
rights of direct political expression and advocacy arc rctai~ed.").
120. See Buckley, 424 U .S. at 15-20 (rejecting treating restrictions on money like restrictions
on conduc t, and deciding to treat them as "restraints on First Amendment liberty that arc both gross
and direct") . But see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:ls Money Speech?, 85 YALE
L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976)( " [N]othing in the First Amendment commits us to the dogma that money
is speech.").
121. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 730 (7th Cir . 1998) (compulsory student

activityfeesfundingconflictswithstudents'"deeplyheldreligiousand personalbeliefs"and the
Constitution guarantees "that 'we the people' will not be compelled to pay for such speech: '[f]o
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyranni cal."' (quoting Abood, 431 U.S . at 234-35 n.31) , rev 'd, No . 98·
1189, 2000 U.S . LEXI S 2196 (Mar . 22, 2000)) .
122. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (independent expenditure ceiling "heavily burdens ... the
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these actions constitutionally the same as government actions compelling or
restricting speech directly is misleading. The individual autonomy impact of
governmental control of individual's money as opposed to her speech is in fact
quite different.
The compelled funding cases derive from cases where the government
compelled speech directly. 123 Where the government compels individuals to
speak or otherwise express words not of their own choosing, an autonomy
violation can occur either because the forced speech indoctrinates the speaker or
because it publicly associates the speaker with the unwanted message. 124 Neither
of these autonomy harms oc~ur "".ithcompelled funding. 12s United States citizens
must fund speech all the time through taxes. 126 These people are not compelled
to utter messages out of their own mouths , to become couriers for the government
message , or otherwise to be publicly associated with the message. 127 They are
simply required to participate, along with a number of other individuals, in
funding speech that a reasonable observer knows does not represent the point of
view of every_ individual who contributed to its propagation. 128 Although
individual taxpayers may violently disagree with the messages of the

an

First Amendment right to 'speak one's mind ... on all. public institutions"' (quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 2S4,269 (1964))).
123. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 23S (quoting West Virginia Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624,642 (1943) (invalidating compelledflag salute and pledge)).
124. See Jacobs,supra note 67.
125. See id.; Cantor, supra note 54.
A first amendmentviolation would not seem to arise without government prescription
of a message or forced identification with, or affirmation of, a message by the payor.
The genre of spiritual invasionentailed in the payment of service fees for ideologically
distasteful ends is quite different fonn the invasion condemned in BarruJtteor Wooley.
Id. at 19.
126. See Southworth,2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •21 ("The government, as a general rule,
may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on parties."); Keller
v. State Bar of CeJ., 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990) ("If every citizen were to have a right to insist that
no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great
concernto the public would be limitedto those in the privatesector, and the process of government
as we know it radically transformed."); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) ("The tax
systemcould not function if denominationswere allowed to challenge the tax system because tax
paymentswere spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.").
127. Cf Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, S21 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1997) (using these
grounds to distinguish forced contributions for advertising from u.nconstitutional compelled
expression).
128. See Cantor, supra note S4, at 25 ("[S]uch incursions upon conscience through forced
'support' of distastefulcauses is an inevitableconcomitantofliving in an organized society."). Cf
Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., SIS U.S. 819, 843-44 (1995) (government
transferof money used for religious speech docs not violate Establishment Clause where method
of distributingmoney to private groups is "religion-neutral").
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govemment129 or private individuals or entities that the government funds with
taxes, 130 this individual impact is not enough to constitute a free speech clause
violation.131
Similarly, restrictions on spending money to produce speech do not impact
individuals' autonomy interests as severely as direct speech restrictions.. A
speaker who cannot spend money can still speak,132 although his means and
probably the size of his audience are limited.133 But a speaker who cannot speak
cannot do it at all. The Court in fact routinely upholds government actions that
restrict the money that is available for speech activities134 or restrict types of
activities on which individualsmight want to spend their money to communicate
a message.m Taxes both compel people to fund expression with which they
disagree and take away financial resourcesthat could beused to communicatethe
Time, place and manner rules may
taxpayer's chosen message.136
constitutionall restrict the way that individuals can spend their money to
37
People who can employ solicitors to ring doorbells still might
communicate.6

,~

129. Tax protestersmust pay taxes despite disagreementwith governmentpoliciesor speech.
Se.eSouthworth,2000 U.S. LEXlS 2196, at •21.
130. See National Endowmentfor the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (governmentfunds
disbursed to artists); Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 834 ("When the governmentdisburses public funds
to private entities to convey a governmentalmessage, it may take legitimate and appropriatesteps
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.").
131. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 ("[W]henthe governmentappropriates public funds
to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.").
132. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 509 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)("The burden on actual speech imposed by limitations
on the spending of money is minimal and indirect All rights of direct political expression and
advocacy are retained.").
133. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) ("A restriction on the amount of moneya
person or group can spend on political commuoicationduring a campaign necessarilyreducesthe
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issuesdiscussed,the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached:"). But see Wright, supra note 120, at 1012 ("The giving and
spending restrictions may cause candidates and other individuals to rely more on less expensive
means of communication. But there is no reason to believe that such a shift in means reduces the
number of issues discussed in a campaign.").
.
134. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 263-64 (White, J., dissenting) (listing numerous ways the
government takes money from media or makes their operationsmore expensive, thus reducingthe
money available for speech).
135. See, e.g., Kovacsv. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)(upholding loudspeakerban); Wardv.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding requirementthat groups use city-provided
sound systems and technicians for concerts in the Bandshell in Central Park).
136. See Cantor, supra note 54, at 28 ("[Under this] rationale, a first amendment attack on
diminution of expressivecapacity could be applicableto every government fiscal extraction- i.e.,
tax, fee, toll, or rent.").
137. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("Even in a public forum the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech.").
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not be allowed to do so. 131 Having the money to construct huge neon signboards
for a yard display does not mean that it is permitted, 139 and volume controls limit
those with the resources to amplify their messages. 140
All of the above ex~ples confirm that when the Court equates money with
speech something other than the impact of the government action on the
complaining individual's ability to speak freely is its reason. While speech is
always speech, whether money is speech for First Amendment purposes depends
upon the context. What is significant about the context is not the degree of
impingement on the individual's personal liberty. Rather, what explains the
money as speech correlation in both the student fee and campaign finance
contexts is the speech market effect of the government action. Specifically, in
both instances the government's regulation of money "skews" 141 the mix of
nongovernment voices in the marketplace of ideas. 142 That the speech market
alteration effect is what brings the First Amendment into play is a crucial link
between the cases because it signals that the constitutional analysis must focus
on the nature of and justification for the marketplace of ideas effect rather than
on an abstract assessment of the degree ofindividual autonomy impingement that
occurs when the government regulates money.
B. Government Purpose : To Create and Structure a Speech Forum
The government actions of compelling the payment of student activity fees
and restricting campaign-related contributions and expenditures have an effect
on the speech market, but, in both contexts, this impact is purposeful rather than
incidental. 143 This government purpose is another crucial link between the cases.
Stated most broadly, the government's purpose in both types of cases is to create

138. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (invalidating blanket no
soliciting rule but stating that a rule that enforced a homeowner's decision not to receive solicitors
would be valid) .
139. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994)(invalidating city's blanket ban on
residential signs but stating that "more temperate measures" could comply with the Constitution) .
140. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 77.
141. Rosenberger v. Rector & Vi sitors of Univ. of Va., SIS U.S. 819,895 (!995) (Souter,
]., dissenting) (there should be no constitutional problem with student activity fee funding because
it "do[es] not skew debate by funding one position but not its competitors"); R.A .V. v. City of St.
Paul, SOSU.S. 377,430 (1992) (finding that a regulation that evidences viewpoint discrimination
"requires particular scrutiny, in part because such regulation often indicates a legislative effort to
skew public debate on an issue").
142. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I , 49-SO( 1976) (condemning government effort to
equalize relative abilities of individuals and groups to participate in political debate).
143. SeeRosenberger,SIS U.S. at 841 ("The object of the [student activity fund] is to open
a forum for speech and to support various student enterprises, including the publication of
newspapers, in recognition of the diversity and creativity of studen_t life."); Buckley , 424 U.S. at 49
(one "government interest" is to "eq ualiz[e] the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence the outcome of elections").

456

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:435

a speech forum that has a different composition of voices than would exist in the
private speech market without government intervention. 144
Purposeful government action that affects the private speech market is highly
suspect. 143 Nevertheless, sometimes even purposefully speech-conscious
government action can comport with the free speech guarantee. Specifically ,
where the government creates and structures a public forum , its ~ech-conscious
action may serve rather than thwart free speech clause values. 14 Where creating
a public forum is the government purpose, the inquiry in any particular case must
be the strength of the government's interest in creating the forum and the
safeguards available to prevent the ostensibly speech-enhancing government
action from having speech-restrictive results.
As in other instances where the government's purpose is to create and
structure a public forum, in both the student fee and campaign · finance contexts
inherent in the government's purpose is the goal of promoting free speech clause
values. 147 While pursuing this purpose involves controversial theoretical 141 and
factual 149 determinations, this goal of affirmatively serving constitutional values
distinguishes these contexts from instances where the government pursues
speech-conscious action for purposes inimical to free speech clause values.

C. The Means: Compelled vs. Restricted Spending
One difference between student fee funding mechanisms and campaign

.... .
· 1'44.' See Buckley,424 U.S. at 49 (purpose is to "equalize'' expressionas comparedto private
distribution)_; Southworthv. Grebe,No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXlS 2196, at •26 (Mar. 22, 2000}
(university's purpose is "to facilitatea wide range of speech''}, rev'g 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998).
145. See, e.g., Wardv. Rock AgainstRacism,491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989}("The government's
purpose is the controllingconsideration[in determiningwhethera regulationis content neutral}."}.
146. See Rosenberger, S15 U.S. at 829-30 (assumingthat in many instancesthe government
may decide to create a limited public forum and discussingthe rules that apply}; Baker, supra note
3, at 16·24 (1998) (discussingnumerousinstancesof"institutionally bound" speech,such as within
.
government decision making bodies).
147. See, e.g., Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1039(9th Cir.
1999) (university's goals arc "inextricably connected with the underlying policies of the First
Amendment'' ); Burt Ncubornc, Buckley's Analytical Flaws, J.L. & POL' Y 111, 121 (1997) (goal
of campaign financing regulation is "to search for a system of structural rules that will enable a
more reasoned, a more open, and a more equal discussion leading up to the crucial vote"}.
148. See Foley, supra note 107, at 23 (noting that "[t}wostarldy different visions dominate
contemporarydebates about campaignfinance reform" and that "[the}stark differencebetweenthe
egalitarian and libertarianposition on campaignfinance derives from a deep-rootedphilosophical
disagreement about economicjustice."}. CompareSouthworth, 151 F.3d at 730 ("educational
benefits" of fee forum do not justify compelling students to fund "speech to which [they]
strenuously object"}, with Rounds, 166F.3d at 1040n.S (''To the extent that Southworthholds that
a public university may not constitutionally establish and fund a limited public forum for the
expression of diverse viewpoints, we respectfullydisagree.").
149. SeeCass, supra note 100, at 1 (questioningpremises of campaign finance refonn).
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financeregulationsis the meansused by the governmentto achieve its objectives.
With respect to activity fees, students object to being forc.ed to pay for speech,
whereas with respect to campaign finance regulations, candidates and their
supporters object to not being allowed to do so. In these cases, however, the
difference in means does not affect the central constitutional issue. .
As noted above, 1'°the centralconstitutionalissue is whetherthe government
may create a public forum for the purpose of diversifyingthe voices that would
be available absent government intervention. This involves assessing the
constitutional interests on either side of the controversies. One of these is the
individual's interest in speaking without governmentregulation.151 .Where the
governmentacts toward speech-directly, free speech doctrine generally does not
distinguish between the means of compulsion and restriction.152 Where the
governmentacts toward an individual's money,there is even less reason to do so.
Whether the governmentcompels spendingtoward speech activities or restricts
them, the individualcan still speak freely.
Despite this fundamentalsimilarity,when money is equatedwith speech,the
governmentmeans of compellingas opposedto restricting spending for speech
producesomewhatdifferent individualand speechmarket effects. These effects,
however, are balanced so that neither the means of compelling or restricting
contributionsfor speech is clearly the better way to preserve free speech clause
values.
On first consideration,the individual impact of compelling fees to fund a
public forum may appear less severe than restricting speech expenditures.
Although fee compulsions indirectly restrict individual spending on speech by
reducingthe overall amount of moneythat the individualhas to engage in speech
activities, after making the required contributions, individuals remain free to
spend any amount of their remaining funds on expression. By contrast,
restrictingindividualspendingfor speechlimitsthe individual's speechspending
for the designated type of speech absolutely.
Another perspective, however, highlights the individual impact of
contribution compulsions. Where individuals pay a fee to support a public

ISO. See supra Part 111.B.
I SI. See supra Part Ill.A. (discussingindividual autonomy interest and the money/speech
correlation).
152. See. e.g., Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97
( 1988)("There is certainlysome differencebetweencompelledspeech and compelledsilence, but
inthe contextof protectedspeech,the difference is withoutconstitutionalsignificance, for the First
Amendmentguarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarilycomprising the decision of both
what to sayand what not to say."). But see 2.audererv. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel, 471 U.S.
626, 651( l 985) ("[l]n virtually all our commercialspeech decisionsto date, we have emphasized
thatbecausedisclosurerequirementstrench much more narrowlyon an advertiser's interests than
do flat prohibitionson speech, 'waming[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriatelyrequired ... in
orderto dissipatethe possibility of consumerconfusionor decepti,on."' (quoting/n re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191,201 (1982))).
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forum, they create speech that would not otherwise have existed. m The
contributors thereby indirectly bring into being speech with which they may
strongly disagree. Where the government restricts expenditures for speech, no
one pays to bring potentially offensive speech into being. Opposing viewpoints
can speak only according to the weight of the resources that they can gamer in
the private speech market. 154 In this way, expenditure restrictions might appear
to be less intrusive on individual speech interests.
Similarly, the speech market effects of contribution compulsions, as opposed
to expenditure restrictions, are mixed so that there is no means to create a speech
forum that is always constitutionally preferable. Although f,ee compulsions do
not directly restrict contributions for speech, they indirectly do so by reducing
contributors' total resources. 155 So, while fees create speech they may also
reduce it. u 6 And, while expenditure restrictions undoubtedly reduce the quantity
of speech by .those subject to the restrictions, they may, in fact, increase speech
by others who perceived expression in an unregulated market to be pointless.
Moreover, the effect of the government's chosen means on the absolute volume
of speech in the marketplace is not the only way to determine whether the
government action serves free speech clause values. If the government can show
a legitimate interest in regulating the relative weight of voices to promote
diversity or fair deliberation, then the crucial inquiry moves from the absolute
volume of speech preserved by the means of compulsion as opposed to restriction
to their comparative merits in achieving one of these alternate objectives.
For all of these reasons, the means of fee compulsion as opposed to
expenditure restriction do not crucially distinguish the student activity fee and
campaign finance issues. The central question in both involves the government's
discretion to choose to create and structure a public forum. Its means, of course ,
will be relevant, but must be assessed in light of the other factors in the
constitutional analysis , specifically the strength of the government purpose and
the effects of the government action in the particular context.

· 153. See Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship , 100 YALEL.J. 2087, 2096
( 1991) (subsidies "have a productive value: they bring into existence [expression]that would not
have existed but for the subsidies.").
I 54. See Cusac, supra note 1, at 30 (quotingAllianceDefenseFund's presidentas proposing
that, instead of distributingstudent fees to I~ popular student groups, "the university could teach
student groups how to market themselves.").
155. See Cantor, supra note 54, at 27 (noting that "a connectionbetween dollars collected
from an individual and expressive activity .. . raises the claim that compelledfinancial extractions
deplete the economic resources of the payor and thereby diminish his expressive capacity.").
156. See id. at 28 (noting that while the claim of diminishedcapacityto speak becauseoffce
exactions may be true absolutely, as a constitutionalclaim it "extend(s] too far" because "a first
amendment attack on diminution of expressivecapacity could be applicable to every government
fiscal extraction-Le. , tax, fee, toll, or rent.").
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Ill. DETERMININGTHE CONSTTTUTIONALL
Y PERMISSIBLE
SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT ACTION

Determining the constitutionally permissible scope of government action in
both the student activity fees and campaign finance cases requires determining
the government interests that can justify purposeful speech market adjustment,
as well as effects that can defeat the constitutionality of the action.

A. Interests That Can Justify Speech Market Adjustm~nt
1. Encouraging Diverse Speech.-In numerous contexts, the government
may choose to encourage diverse expression, even though this purpose
necessarily changes the mix of voices in the private speech market from what it
would have been absent government intervention. One of these contexts is ~here
the government allocates a scarce resource. The government can allocate radio
waves"' and regulate cable television 158 to serve the public interest in receiving
a broad range of types of expression. Pursuing this interest, of course, results in
a different mix of radio and television speakers than would allocation to the
highest bidders.
Another way that the government can encourage diverse expression is by
creating and maintaining public forums. 159 The constitutional doctrine that
defines public forums emphasizes that the government must act "neutrally" when
it structures the conversation within these arenas, 160 perhaps lending the
impression that the speech that occurs in public forums merely amplifies the
speech that occurs in the private marketplace of ideas. This emphasis on
neutrality, however, obscures the speech adjustment inherent in creating or
maintaining the forum in the first instance. The existence of public forums
generally augments the speech power of minority as opposed to majority voices,
and of poor as opposed to wealthy speakers. 161 Public forums actually represent

157. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, J.69
(1969) (discussing the Federal CommunicationsCommission's "fairness doctrine" which requires
that "discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those
issues must be given fair coverage.").
158. See Turner Bro~. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Com~unications Comm'n, 520 U.S. 180, 189
(1997) (holding that must-carry regulation imposed on cable operators serves "three interrelated
interests:(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the•air local broadcast television, (2) promoting
the widespreaddissemination ofinfonnation from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair
competitionin the market for television programming").
159. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(describingthree different types of public forum: traditional, limited public, and nonpublic).
160. See id. (regulations must be content neutral in a traditional public forum); Rosenberger,
515U.S. at 830-31 (in a limited public forum, regulations must be viewpoint neutral, and must be
content neutral except to the extent necessary to maintain the purposes of the forum); Perry Educ.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (regulations in a nonpublic forum must be viewpoint neutral).
161. Neutral rules for allocating the forums will usually diminish private power differences.
For example, a rule that allows each student group to meet in a university classroom once a month
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a redistribution of resources from majority to minority speakers as government
funds pay to create and maintain the arenas. 162
Creating and maintaining public forums represents one form of government
subsidy of speech. The government may also make more direct money payments
to encourage diverse private speech. Arts funding by the government brings art
into being that would not otherwise exist, thus purposefully and necessarily
affecting the content of the marketplace of ideas. 163 Funding of public television
similarly creates private speech and affects the private speech market. And,
when universities sponsor speakers series, they act with the purpose of exposing
their students to ideas not sufficiently available or prominent in the private
market. 164 In all of these instances, the public purpose of creating diversity in the
marketplace of ideas justifies using public resources to pursue it.
The government may also sometimes act through the means of restricting
speech to achieve its goal of promoting diverse expression. Structuring and
maintaining even the most open public forums involves restricting the speech of
some private individuals to preserve the forum for a broad range of participants.
Parade pennits 165 time limi~ or allocations 166 and volume controls 167 limit the
quantity of speech that any individual can deliver, but are also consistent with
encouraging wide open discussion and debate. Moreover, if subsidies are viewed
as productive, giving funding to one sgeaker necessarily silences another who
wanted to receive the scarce funding.•

would give the five-person group the same accessas the fifty-persongroup. See, e.g., Widmarv.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university meeting facilitiesmust be open to all student groups).
If forcedto pay for the facilities,the groupswould likely not have equal access. In some instances,
however,"neutral'' rules can reinforceor exacerbateexistingpower differences. A universityrule
providingclassroomaccessonly to groupswith membershipoffifty or morewould havethis effect ·
by granting a subsidy only to groups with broad support.
162. See Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va, SIS U.S. 819, 843-44 {1995)
("The governmentusuallyacts by spendingmoney. Even the provision of a meetingroom [which
constitutesa publicforum)involve[s]governmental
expenditure
, if onlyin the formof electricity
and heating or cooling costs.").
163. See National Endowment for the Ans v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (National
Endowment for the Arts uses federal funds to "help create and sustain" art (citing 20 U.S.C. §
951(7)); Fiss, supra note 153, at 2096 ("[Subsidies]have a productive value: they bring into
existence art, perfonnances, or exhibitionsthat would not have existedbut for the subsidies.").
164. See Southworthv. Grebe, 151F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1998)(studentsdo not challenge
use of the studentactivity feesto fund the DistinguishedLectureSeries),rev 'd, No. 98-1189,2000
U.S. LEXIS 2196 (Mar. 22, 2000).
165. See Cox v. New Hampshire,312 U.S. 569 (1941).
166. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, SIS U.S. 753 (1995) (private
groups can erect unattended displays for a certain numberof weeks).
167. See Ward v. RockAgainstRacism,491U.S. 781 (I 989)(perfonners requiredto use city
sound equipment in Central Park Ban.dshell).
168. See Fiss, supra note I 53, at 2097 ("[S]ilencing is a necessary concomitantof every
allocative decision").
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In all of these ways, the government can- act to diversify the expression
available for public consumption even though inherent in the act of
diversification is adjustment of the mix of voices in the marketplace of ideas.
2. Promoting Fair Deliberation anflDecisionmaking.- Another interestthat
can justify purposefully speech-conscious government action is to promote fair
deliberation and decision making. Judicial proceedings, legislative sessions, 169
and administrative hearings operate according to rules that purposefully adjust
what would be the private speaking power of the participants. 170 Strict rules
definethe quantity of speech that any individual speaker can deliver 171and public
monies fund the forums, thereby effectively transferring speech resources by
government fiat.
Like the speech adjustment to pursue the purpose of diversity, this speech
adjustment also has the effect of privileging some speakers over others,
particularly those without private power over those who possess it. Moreover,
sometimes the government purpose to restrict the speech of more powerful
speakers to prevent one message from drowning out all others can be more
blatant when the need is more compelling. One circumstance is union elections,
where rules limit the employer's voice to ensure that employees can receive and
digest alternate messages. 172
These instances demonstrate that some public interests in full or fair debate
can justify purposeful government adjustment of voices in the marketplace of
ideas, as well as the use of public resources to do so. They also represent broad
acceptance of the government's discretion to choose equalizing the powers of
various speakers as the means to ensure fairness in debate, deliberation and
decision making .
3. Protecting Disfavored Speakers.-The Constitution not only allows the
government to act in ways that adjust the relative weights of private voices in the
marketplace of ideas , sometimes it requires the govemmenno do so. One such
instance is when unpopular speakers create a hostile audience reaction . 173 Absent

169. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov'tPAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,9 12 (2000)(Breycr, l. , concurring)
. ("[IlnCongress•.. constitutionallyprotecteddebateOis limitedto provide every memberan equal
opportunityto express his·or her views.").
170. See Baker, supra note 3, at 21-24 ("Within institutions of democratic governance,
acceptableregulation of speech, including content regulation,is ubiquitous.").
171. See, e.g., EdwardB. Foley, Public Debate and Campaign Finance, 30 CONN.L. REV.
817, 819 ( 1998)("[T)he Chief Justicedoes not violatethe Constitutionwhen he tells advocates that
their time is up during oral argument in the SupremeCourt.").
172. See Clyde W. Summers,Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective Labor Law, 41
CATH.U.L. REV.791,805 (l 998)(1istinglimitationson employerspeech and proposing additional
ones).
173. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (demonstrators arrested
becausetheir speech incited onlookers to violence); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(speakerarrested because his speech was "inflammatory"); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229, 237 ( 1963)(speakersarrested becausetheir speech was "suffi~ientlyopposed to the views of
themajorityof the communityto attract a crowd and necessitatepolice protection"); Feinerv. New
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government intervention, the hostile audience would likely silence the speaker. 174
Where public disorder is imminent., arresting the speaker to prevent the violence
would mirror the result of the private marketplace of ideas. The Constitution,
however, forbids this. m To fulfill its responsibility of preserving public order,
the government must use the threat of force to protect the unpopular speaker. 176
Not only does protecting a speaker from a hostile audience change the mix
of voices that would otherwise exist in the marketplace of ideas, it also both
redirects resources from majority to minority speakers and restricts the speech
of majority speakers to ensure that the minority speech can be heard. When
unpopular speech provokes an audience to violence, the least costly option is to
arrest the speaker. By foreclosing this option, the Constitution effectively
mandates that the government expend majority resources to protect the minority
speaker, even though the public resources expended to do so far exceed the
speaker's "share" of the speech market. 177 This use of public _resources ·
subsidizes minority speech with majority dotlars. 178
Police protection of unpopular speakers can also take the form of restricting
majority speech that threatens to drown out the minority message. 179 So, police
may eject hecklers from speech halls or quiet a crowd that makes it impossible

York, 340 U.S. 315,317 (1951) ("[Police) stepped ln to prevent [speech] from resulting.in a
fight."); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 3 (1949) (speaker arrested and charged with using
speech that "stir[redJ the public to anger, invit[ed] dispute, [brought) about a condition of unrest,
or creat[ed) a disturbance").
174. See, e.g., Gregory,394 U.S. at 111(noting the ratio between demonstrator and onlooker
was 85:1000).
175. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.l (19q6) ("Participants in an orderly
demonstration in a public place are not chargeablewith the danger, unprovoked except by the fact
of the constitutionallyprotected demonstration itself, that their critics might react with disorder.or
violence."). This rule evolved over time. CompareFeiner, 340 U.S. at 320 (speaker can be
arrested for "the reaction [his speech] a~ly
engendered"), with Gregory, 394 U.S. at 111
(speaker cannot be arrested for disorderly conduct because of listeners' reaction).
176. See Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237 (''.TheFourteenth Amendment [of the Constitution) does
not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.").
177. See Gregory, 394 U.S. at 111 (o·ne hundred police officers protect 85 protesters);
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 136(1992) (holding that a county cannot
charge a higher demonstration fee to cover the cost of police protection "in the case of a
controversial political message delivered before a hostile audience").
178. See Francis X. Clines, Neo--NazisCancel D.C. March After Only 4 Show Up,
SACRAMENTO BEE,Aug. 8, 1999,at A6 (a force of 1,426 police officers provided a security cordon
for a neo-Nazi hate march that did not occur; police chieflaments that "the city hadjust spent close
to SI million protecting the civil rights of a no-show troublemaker.").
179. See Gregory,394 U.S. at 111 (Constitution does not permit police to arrest about 8S
protesters because of hostile reaction of over I 000 onlookers); see also In re Kay, I Cal. 3d 930,
941 (1970) (en bane) ("[T]he state retains a legitimateconcern in ensuring that some individuals'
unruly assertion of their rights of free expression does not imperil other citizens' rights of free
association and discussion.").
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for the speaker to be heard. The silenced speakers may speak at another time, in
another place or in another manner. Nevertheless, the government action of
.restricting what would be their private power to dominate and drown out less
powerful speakers alters and equalizes the balance of voices in the marketplace
of ideas.
Numerous free s~ech clause values underpin this requirement that the
government act affirmatively to protect unpopular speakers. 180 In any event, its
gist refutes a vision of the First Amendment that enshrines private ordering as the
speech market distribution that best serves the public value of robust discussion
and debate. Embedded in free speech clause doctrine is the different vision of
the minority speaker or. "lonely pamphleteer" 181 as entitled to government
protection beyond that which he would beable to acquire either through votes in
the democratic process or dollars in the private market. That this vision compels
the redistribution ofresourcesand sometimes the suppression of majority speech
to protect, and thereby encourage, minority speech suggests that it also leaves
room for government discretion to decide to do these things for this purpose.

B. Constitutional Concerns That Can Invalidate
Speech-Conscious Government Action
1. The Danger of Government Favoritism.-The primary danger against
which the free speech clause protects is governmental favoritism of certain
viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas. 182 Whether the favoritism takes the form
~

...

180. See EdwardL. Rubin, ReviewEssay: Nazis.Skokie, and the FirstAmendment as Virtue,
74CAL. L. REV.233 ( 1986)(discussingfree speech clause values that might protect Nazi speech);
LeeBollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflectionson an "Ea.vyCase" and Free Speech Theory, 80
MICH.L. REV.617 (1982).
One can understand , .. [the] choice to protect the free speech activities of Nazis, but
not because people would value their message in the slightest or believe it should be
seriously entertained, not because a commitment to self-government or rationality
logicallydemandsthat such ideasbe presentedfor consideration, ... not becausea line
couldnot be drawn that would excludethis ideologywithout inevitablyencroachingon
ideas that one likes-not for any of these reasons nor others related to them that are a
part of the traditional baggageof the free speech argumentation;but rather becausethe
danger of intolerance towards ideas is so pervasive an issue in our social lives, the
processof masteringa capacityfor toleranceso difficult, that it malcessense somewhere
in the system to attempt to confrontthat problemand exercise more self-restraintthan
may be otherwiserequired.
Id. at 629-31.
181. See Branzburgv. Hayes,408U.S. 665, 704(1972)("Traditionaldoctrine[is] that liberty
of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteerwho uses carbon paper or a mimeographjust as
muchas of the largemetropolitan publisherwho utllizes the latest photocompositionmethods.").
182. See Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitorsof Univ. of Va., SIS U.S. 819, 828 (1995)( "In
the realmof private speech or expression,governmentregulationmay not favor one speaker over
another.").
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of a resource transfer 113 or a speech restriction, 114 the Court looks at it with great
suspicion. This suspicion stems from the fact that government censorship
threatens all of the values that underlie the free speech guarantee."'
Fundamental to these values is ensuring that there exists a wide open and robust
marketplace of ideas so that individuals can seek to discover individual truths 116
as well as engage in the reflective self-government on which democracy
depends. 117
This fear of government favoritism in the speech market leads to the
fundamental analytical division in free speech clause doctrine between contentbased and content neutral government actions. 188 The fonner are subject to strict
scrutiny, 189 while the latter are subject to a balancing that weighs the government
interest against the burden on free speech interests. 190 Although viewpoint
discrimination is the most egregious form of government favoritism, 191 subject

. . . ·, ,~

i

''

!•

183. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center MorichesUnion Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(holding that a schooldistrictcannotprovidemeeting-roomaccessto speakabout familyissuesbut
deny it to those who speak from a religiousperspective).
184. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (city cannot criminalizeonly
subset of fighting words that express particulartypes of animus).
185. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt,Free SpeechJustifications,89 COLUM.
L. REv. 119(1989)
(listing and d.iscussingvaluesthat underpinthe free speech guarantee).
186. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting a "profound
national commibnenttothe principlethat debateon publicissuesshouldbeuninhibited,robust,and
wide-open");Whitneyv. California,274 U.S. 357,375 (1927)("Thosewhowon our independence
.•. believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth.. .. "); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competitionof the market."); JOHNSTUART
MJLL,ON LIBERTY( 1959)(articulating
the "search for truth" rationalefor prohibitinggovernmentsuppressionof speech).
187. See ALEXANDER
MEIKLBJOHN,
FREESPEECHAND ITSRELATIONTO
SELF-GOVERNMENT
( 1948)("Whenmen governthemselves,it is they--Md no oneelse-who mustpassjudgment upon
unwisdom and unfairnessand danger. [Just] so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide
an issue are denied acquaintancewith infonnationor opinion [which]is relevantto that issue.just
so far the result may be ill-eonsidcred. [It] is that .mutilation of the thinking process of the
community against which the First Amendment [is] directed."); see also Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in FirstAmendment T~ory, 1977AM. B. FOUND
. REs. J. 523 ("(F]rccspoech [can
serve the value of) checking abuse of power by public officials.").
188. See. e.g., R.A. V.,SOSU.S. at 382("TheFirstAmendmentgenerallypreventsgovernment
fromproscribingspeech[becauseof] disapprovalof the ideasexpressed.Contc;nt-basedregulations
arc presumptivelyinvalid.").
189. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local EducatorsAss'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
190. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
191. See Rosenbergerv. Rector& Visitorsof Univ.of Va., S 15U.S. 819,829 (l 995)(''When ·
the governmenttargets not subject matter, but particularviews taken by speakerson a subject,the
violation of the First Amendmentis all the more blatant.").
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matter discrimination is generallyalso subject to rigorous review192 becausethe
governmentpurpose is to skew the marketplaceof ideas.193
From these concerns stems Buckley 's rule that, regardless of viewpoint or
content sensitivity, government actions are highly suspect when they "involve
'suppressingcommunication"'to achievean "equalizing''effect,194 implyingthat
this purpose, too, creates the danger of governmentfavoritismthat is inimical to
free speech clause ideals.195 Along with the great danger of government
favoritism, however, is the fundamental purpose of the free speech clause to
preserve a diverse marketplace of ideas.196 Despite the great danger of any
governmentmanipulationof the speechmarket,this fundamentalpurpose means
that the free speech clause leaves room for, and in some instances, mandates,
speech-consciousgovernment actions that are consistent with it. The great
difficulty is determining where a particular government action falls on the
spectrum between dangerous favoritism and salutary speech market
enhancement.
In particular, the Buckley rule against government equalizing coexists with
the assumptionthat government-createdforums and direct monetary subsidiesof
privatespeech are consistentwith, and in fact promote,the values that underpin
the First Amendment, even though both of these actions adjust and equalize the
relativeweights of voices in the marketplaceofideas. Becausethe government's
purpose is the same in both contexts, the question is whether a concern with
government favoritism explains the different abilities of the government to
achieve it.
· ·
Governmentforums and speechsubsidiesare presumptivelyconsistent with
free speech clause values when they do not exhibit the type of "government
favoritism" inimicalto free speech clause values. Access to these opportunities
must be either content or viewpoint neutral, meaning that it is distributed
accordingto principles that do not depend upon the expression's message.197
Specifically, where the governmentcreates a limitedpublic forum, it can engage
in content discriminationto preserve the purposes of the forum, but it cannot

192. See Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (contentdiscriminationis permissiblein certain

circumstances
wherethe governmentcontrolsthe speechor forum).
193. See Bursonv. Freetnan,S04U.S. 191, 197(1992)("[T]be First Amendment's hostility
to content-basedregulationextendsnot only to a restrictionon a particularviewpoint,but also to
a prohibition of public discussionof an entire topic.").
194. Buckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (l 9'76).
19S. See id ("The First Amendment's protectionagainst governmentalabridgmentof free
expression cannot properly be made to dependon a person's financialability to engage in public
discussion.").
196. See id. ("[The First Amendment] was designed to secure the widest possible
disseminationofinfonnation from diverseand antagonisticsources." (quoting New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,376 U.S. 2S4, 266 (1964)(internal quotationsomitted))).
197. See Perry Educ. "Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(articulatingrules of accessfor varioustypes of government forms).
'
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discriminate according to viewpoint. 191 A neutrality that looks to the viewpoint
expressed is different from a neutrality that looks to private power, either by
number of adherents or by financial resources. Requiring this first type of
neutrality thus condones purposeful government speech market adjustment.
First Amendment doctrine embraces the equalizing tendency of content
neutral access rules as preferable to the danger of "favoritism" where the
government considers the expression's message in allocating speech
opportunities. 199 This is true even though, because the government presumptively
represents majority sentiment. viewpoint-sensitive allocations would better
mirror the private speech market. Equality among viewpoints as a principle of
distribution is constitutionally "fair" even though its probable effect is to
redistribute private speech power. In fact, its fairness may stem from the
recognition that the probable redistribution that occurs when the government
creates a public forum is against the majority's interests. The free speech clause
was meant to protect against the inevitable urge of the majority in charge of the
government to skew the marketplace of ideas in its own favor. Granting new
speech opportunities equally to all comers tends to advantage less powerful
voices. This effect is the opposite of the "favoritisn( that the free speech clause
condemns. That the government disadvantages itself is a factor counseling in
favor of the constitutionality of a speech-conscious government action.
By contrast to government promoting speaker diversity by creating a public
forum, viewpoint-based actions to pursue the same diversity interest carry a
greater favoritism danger. For example, the purpose of restricting hate speech
or pornography is not only speech conscious but also sets out to disadvantage
certain points of view.2<,o Although the government's argument is that a
deficiency in the private market requires government intervention and that such
intervention will diversity the range of voices available, 201 these effects are
debatable and come with the certain effect of the government expressly
advantaging certain viewpoints.
Consequently , a crucial consideration when the gove~e~t se~~stq ~ugme~t

· ' T98: -itoseit6erger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ .. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995)
199. See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 98· I I 89, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •33 (Mar. 22, 2000),
rev 'g 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir . 1998) ("The whole the(?ry of viewpoint neutrality is that minority
views are treated with the same respect as majority views.") ..
200 . See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985)
(condemning anti-pornography ordinance because "[ u]nder the ordinance graphic sexually explicit
speech is ' pornography' or not depending on the perspective the author adopts"), afl'd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986); R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S . 377, 378 (1992) (condemning hate speech
ordinance because it "imposes special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects ").
201. See Note , Anti-PornographyLaws and First Amendment Values,98 HARV
. L. REv. 460,
475 (1984) (noting , with respect to pornography, "the self-expression argument is double-edged .
Tho se who oppose pornography assert that pornography denies women their right to individual
dignity and choice. They maintain that pornography forces the state to choose whose right to
individual dignity and choice it will protect.").
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speaker diversity by creating a limited public forum is whether it does so in a
viewpoint neutral manner. "Favoritism," meaning viewpoint-sensitivity in the
allocation of speech opportunities, will likely condemn the government action.
But, the lack of favoritism when the government acts with the same diversity
purpose cuts the other way. That is, public forum doctrine recognize s that free
speech clause values are on the government's side when it chooses to pursue
speaker diversity by regulating in a viewpoint neutral way. 202
2. Distorting Public Perceptions.--Creating diversity means changing the
balance in the marketplace of ideas. A danger of such speech-conscious
government action is that it will distort public perceptions of the support that
certain ideas have and thereby . distort individual truth-seeking and selfgovernment deliberations. 203
The degree of this danger depends on sevC?ralfactors. The first is the degree
of accurate correlation between the quantity and volume of speech in the private
market and the validity of the ideas in the public's evaluation . . Ability to speak
often and loudly in the private market correlates to wealth and political power.
Neither of these necessarily accurately reflect the weight or validity of ideas in
the public mind. "Distortion" must be measured against an ideal. Private speech
ordering is not necessarily it. With respect to the weight of political ideas, one
speech dollar per vote might more accurately convey public sentiment .204
Another factor relevant to distorting public perceptions is the degree of
public awareness of the government's involvement in the mix of voices. In a
public forum, such as the street comer soap box, or a ritualized forum, such as
a criminal trial or legislative debate, no one thinks, or at least no one should
think,205 that rules equalizing access accurately reflect the public support for the
ideas expressed. To the extent that the public knows the rules of the game, it is
aware that it must seek information about the public acceptance of the ideas from
some source other than the forum.206 This knowledge greatly reduces the danger

202. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •28 (imposing only a "requirement of
viewpointneutrality in the allocationof funding support").
203. See Donald L. Beschle, ConditionalSpending and the FirstAmendment: Maintaining
the Commitmentto Rational Liberal Dialogue,51 Mo. L. R.Ev,1117, 1150 (1992) (noting danger
of distortion of public debate when governmentselectively subsidizespoints of view).
204. See Foley, supra note 12, at 1213 (arguing that "equal-dollars•per-yoter, like oncpcrson-onc-vote, is an essential preconditionof a democraticlegislativeprocess.").
205. Cf Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, S15 U.S. 763, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)(endorsementinquiry under the establishmentclause should look to the perspectiveof
a "hypotheticalobserver'' who "must be deemedaware of the history and context of the forum.");
see also id. at 768 & n.3 (pluralityopinion)(discussingthat if governmentin fact operatesa public
forum even reasonable mistake of observer about endorsement of a religious display should not
render access to the forum invalid).
206. See Carolyn Wiggin,A Funny ThingHappens when You Payfor a Forum: Mandatory
StudentFees to Support PoliticalSpeech at Public Universities,103 YALELJ. 2009, 2027 (1994)
(arguingagainst selectivegovernmentfundingof viewpointswithin a public forum, but noting that
maintainingthe forum docs not create this problem because"the public assumesthat speech or art
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of distortion.
3. Suppressing the Speech of Some in the Process of Promoting the Speech
of Others ....:._.
The effect of suppressing speech whHeostensibly promoting it is a

constitutional danger, as it can defeat the very purpose that justifies the
government action. It is first important to locate where this consideration enters
in the context of student fees and campaign finance. As already noted,207 that the
government regulates money as opposed to speech directly diminishes the
individual autonomy im·pact. Moreover, where the government acts to enhance
speech the First Amendment enters on both sides of the analysis, meaning that
the mere fact that the government action diminishes individuals' speech
opportunities indirectly is not enough to resolve the constitutional question.208
Once the government demonstrates a legitimate purpose for adjusting the
private speech market, the concern with individual impact is appropriately
addressed in the means inquiry. That the means to promote the government
purpose reduces the quantity of speech in the marketplace of ideas balances
against the validity of the govetnment action. The question, then, is whether the
government purpose is powerful enough to justify some speech suppression. If
so, the additional question is whether any less speech suppressing means exist to
achieve the government's objective.
An example is where the government compels one entity to carry the speech
of another for the purpose of presenting the public with a diversity of points of
view.209 Although the purpose serves First Amendment values, a danger in thjs
context is that the requirement will silence the forced speakeror at least alter the
content of the speaker's expression.210 The question, then, is whether there exists
a less speech suppressing means to achieve the government's objective. Usually
there does, because the government could create a public forum funded by all the
speech beneficiaries rather than by one alternate speaker.211
This danger is less pronounced in the context of student activity fees and

within a public forum is representative of views held by members of the public as opposed to
officially sanctioned views.").
207. See supra Part II.A.
208. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov'tPAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,912 (2000)(Breyer, J., concurring)
("[W]here a law significantly implicatescompeting·constitutionallyprotected interests in complex
ways[,) the Court has . . . refrained from employing a simple test that effectively presumes
nonconstitutionality.").
209. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. t (1986) (utilities
commission order required PG&E to place ratepayer group's newsletter in its billing envelopes);
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (statute required newspapers to print
replies of candidates attacked in editorials).
210. See Tornillo, 4 t 8 U.S. at 257 (editors subjectto right-of-reply requirement «might well
conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy"); Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 15
(envelope inclusions requirement would have same effect).
211. See Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 15 (contrasting "content-neutral subsidies" with
envelope insertion requirement that "forces the speakers opponent-not the tax-paying public-<o
assist in disseminating the speaker's message").
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campaign financing because the government regulates money rather than speech
directly. The regulations do not do anything to the individual's ability to speak
on all topics. Nevertheless, both types ofregulation limitthe individual's ability
to spend to speak, which means they are volume limitations. Although not as
worrisome as content limitations, volume limitations still pose a First
Amendment danger. But, while it is very difficult for the government to justify
a content limitation, content neutral volume restrictions are easier to justify.
Even when the government does not have First Amendment values on its side,
volume restrictions can beconsistent with the free speech guarantee. 212 That the
government has such values on its side should add legitimacy to the government
action.
·
If the government ' s purpose is to create a public forum to promote diverse
expression or enhance fair decisionmaking, the question must be whether the
purpose justifies suppressing some speech in the process. Where the government
compels fees to fund a forum thereby reducing the speech resources of all
contributors, the inquiry must be whether the government has a legitimate
interest in promoting diverse speech for its constituency, and whether it has
spread the burden across the beneficiaries thereby lessening it for all. Where the
government restricts expenditures for speech, the same considerations apply. In
both instances, the Constitution also requires some inquiry into the absolute
amount of the burden. The money payments required or restricted should not be
so great as to defeat the purpose that justifies the government action. 213 In
particular, the government actions ideally should be tailored to preserve the
ability of the burdened speakers to speak on all topics while limiting their ability
to engage in repetition.
IV. APPLYINGTHE ANALYSIS TO FEES AND FINANCING
The potential constitutional harm that links the university fee and campaign
financing issues is that the government regulates money for the purpose of
manipulating the private speech market Although such a purpose is always
highly suspect, sometimes the government can engage in purposeful speech
manipulative action. The circumstances of the particular regulation determine
whether the government has a sufficient justification to engage in speechconscious action and whether the regulation is well tailored to minimize the
constitutionally dangerous effects of the government action.

A. Fees
Mechanisms for assessing and distributing student fees vary. Most important
in assessing a challenge to particular distributions used for expressive activities

212. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism,491 U.S. 781 (1989); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949).
213. See Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 909 (campaign finance limits should not be "so low as to
impede the ability of candidatesto 'amass the resourcesnecessaryfor effectiveadvocacy'" (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 21 (1976))).
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must bethe nature of the government's justification. The crucial question must
be whether the university is expending fees for the purpose of creating a speech
forum. 214 This purpose distinguishes a fee case from other mandatory payments
cases, where speech was incidental to a primarily nonspeech purpose. rn Absent
the diversity justification, a fees case becomes like these previous payments
cases, with the university having very limited leeway to subsidize speech to
achieve its nonspeech purpose .216
A university expending fees to create a speech forum has powerful
justifications on its side. Its purpose to foster intellectual diversity is directly
linked to its educational mission .217 As such, it is at least as strong as the
government's more general purpose to promote speech by subsidizing public
forums.
Although fostering simple exposure to a wide range of views is a university' s
most compelling justification, it can also assert an interest in promoting fairness
in the presentation of views to its students during a critical period of selfformation.
The mechanics of particular distribution systems will determine when a
university can assert the additional purpose of protecting disfavored speakers.
Unless the distribution system is keyed to Jocking in or augmenting the status
quo, the university will be able to assert this interest. This interest, in turn, helps
defeat the concern that the effect of the redistribution will be to fund university:.
favored points of view. Again, the· system's mech~ics will be important.
Established criteria, decisions by a changing body of students, and a record of
distributing funds to a wide range of applicants without regard to their majority
status will defeat concerns of favoritism .
Most university funding schemes would seem to pose little danger of
<. .

.,..
214. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at • 33 (doubting whether the referendum
process for funding student groups appropriately creates a limited public forum because it appears
to "substitute[] majority detenninations for viewpoint neutrality") ; Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of
Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing funding of Public Interest
Research Group as one of many groups from "a general student activities fee [that] could be
perceived as creating a forum to support diverse viewpoints" from previous case in which PIRG
received a mandatory fee that "was separate from the general student fee [and so] ... created a
forum that only supported OPIRG's viewpoints." (citing Galda v. Rutgers , 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir.
l98S); Galda v. Bloustein , 686 F.2d IOS9(3d Cir. 1982))).
215 . E.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. I (1990) (state bar dues); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (union dues).
216 . See Keller, 496 U.S. at 13 (expenditures from mandatory payments for ideological
activities must be "germane to the purpose for which the compelled association was justified").
217 . See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at *26 (university's purpose "t o facilitate a
wide range of speech" is "important and substantial"); Rosenberger v. Regents & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., SIS U.S. 819, 836-37 (1995) (tracing universities' educational missions from "ancient
Athens", through the time when "Europe entered into a new period of intellectual awakening" to
the present day when " [t]he quality and creative power of student intellectual life ... remains a
vital measure of a school's influence and attainment.") .

2000]

FEES AND CAMPAIGNFINANCING

471

distortion. The student activity fees funding mechanism is public so all members
of the audience presumably know of the redistribution that occurs. Concerned
universities could further eliminate the danger of distortion by requiring those
groups that receive student fee funding to disclose it in the course of their
communications.
Finally, student activity fees funding suppresses the ability of contributors
to speak only minimally . Extracting fees does not affect any student ' s ability to
speak on any topic . While it diminishes a student's total assets available for
speech, the resource diminution is usually minimal and its effect is no different
than tuition, which diminishes student assets by a far greater amount.
B. Campaign Financing
Promoting both diversity and fairness can justify campaign financing
regulation , although the weight of the objectives is reversed from the student fees

context.Specifically,promotingfairdeliberationoncampaign-relatedissuesthat
lead to the decisions that form our representative democracy is as compelling a
purpose as promoting such deliberation once the bodies of government are
constituted. 218 Regulations that tend toward equality are consistent with the rules
that govern other decision making. 219 In addition, promoting diversity
particularly supports campaign finance regulation because of the self-government
rationale that underpins the free speech clause.220 Regulations that tend toward
equality tend to protect disfavored speakers, in the context of campaigns ,
meaning those critical of the existing government. Thus, all of these
justifications support campaign finance regulation .
The specifics of particular regulations will determine whether potentially
dangerous effects undermine these purposes. Favoritism is a potent danger .
Although equalizing rules may seem to protect government outsiders, there is
also the concern that incumbents can achieve name recognition and publicity of

218. See Baker, rupra note 3, at 2-3.
[L)egislativedebates, committee hearings,j udicial proceedings, and agency proceedings
are contexts where politica l speech occurs with in 17gally structur ed or institutionally
bound parts of government In each of these realms, explicitly political and fully
protected speech is often subject to severe limits, justified by the goal of making the
particular institutional element of government better perform its democratic and
governing functions .... [qampaign speech is an institutionally bound subcategory of
political speech. [Campaign finance) [r)egulations are just ified as long as they aim at
increasing the democratic quality of the institutionalized process of choosing public
official or mak ing binding legal decisions.

Id
219 . See Foley , supranote 12, at 1213 (equality of campaign speech opportunities stems from
equal weight of votes rule) .
220. See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn , The First Amendmentls an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr .
REv. 245, 255 ("The First Amendment protects the freedom of those activities of thought and
communication by which we govern .").
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their points of view without the expendituresrequired by challengers who cannot
converse with constituents at government expense.221 Another concern is that
campaign finance regulation adopted by incumbents will always embody this
bias.222 These are potent concerns and particular regulations must be reviewed
with them in mind. That monied interests consistently oppose campaign finance
regulations suggests however that concerns of incumbent advantage may be
overstated. The crucial point is that the danger of insider advantage should be
the focus of the inquiry, not free speech rights more abstractly. Regulations of
money do not affect individual autonomy interests to the same extent as direct
speech restrictions, and even direct speech restrictions are permissible when
supported by the government purpose of promoting full and fair deliberation'in
a decision making forum.
That the public will be misled by the effects of campaign finance limits
seems unlikely. As with fees, it is possible to advertisethe specifics of the limits
and their equalizing effects. Once the nature of the regime is clear, the public
should be no more misled than is a jury ,that hears the same number of minutes
of argument from both the prosecutor and the defense.
Finally, campaign finance regulations indeed carry with them the danger of
suppressing speech absolutely in the pursuitof diversifyingits content. Although
the danger of suppressing speech by restricting what an individual can do with
money is more attenuated than a direct speech restriction, it is still a real danger.
Nevertheless, even direct speech restrictionscomportwith the Constitutionwhen
the government's interest is strong enough. The crucial question is thus the
weight of the government interest as compared to the likelihood and degree of
speech suppression. Certainly, the government must prove the need to limit
expenditures to achieve fairness and diversity.223 In addition, regulations that
limit the ability of a speaker to repeat pose less of a constitutional danger than
those that limit the ability to express ideas for the first time.
CONCLUSION

The student activity fees and campaign finance regulation challenges raise
the same question: the scope of the government's discretionto redistributemoney
to create and structu.re a public forum. The government generally can create
public forums so long as it does not tavor or di'Sfavorparticular types of
expression. Creatingsuch forums for diverse expressionservesthe constitutional
value of promoting deliberation that includes a wide range of points of view,

221. See Foley, supra note 12, at 1243(addressing concern that campaign finance limits may
"act as an incumbency-protectiondevice").
222. See Cass, supra note 100, at 57 ("[T]he risk that the law regulating campaign finance
disadvantages outsiders and advantages insiders, if not irresistiblystrong, is at least more palpable
than the banns it is supposed to cure.").
223. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 900 (2000) ("The question of
empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightenedjudicial scrutiny oflcgislative judgments will vary
up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.").
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even though this government action redistributes speech resources to achieve thi s
objective: When the government 's purpose in compelling student activity fees
or regulating campaign spending 'is similarly to promote the free speech clause
value of nurturing rich and full discussion of public issues, these same public
forum principles should apply. In both contexts, the government's interest in
equalizing speech resources to serve the expressive and deliberative interests of
its · entire constituency should have weight sufficient to defeat claims by
dissenters that such redistribution by the government violates their free speech
rights. Whether in any particular case the government's interest in fact prevail s
over the interests of dissenters must depend upon how well tailored the means are
to achieve the theoretically pennissible objective.

